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Abstract
The Great Recession caused states around the country to make substantial budget cuts to public
education. As a result, districts that rely more heavily on state funding – those with greater
concentrations of students in poverty – may be disproportionately impacted by the Great
Recession funding cuts; however, little prior research examines this issue. This study examines
how state school finance systems responded to recessionary funding cuts on average nationally.
The study then draws on state specific data to examine local district taxation patterns in response
to state spending cuts. The study finds that (a) on average across states, high-poverty districts
experienced an inequitable share of funding and staffing cuts following the Great Recession; (b)
changes in the income-based funding gap varied across states; (c) higher-poverty districts
increased local tax rates at a faster rate than low-poverty districts in Texas; and (d) the funding
gap increased in Texas by more than in 43 other states; (e) lack of subsidies for facilities funding
and other idiosyncrasies within the Texas school finance system prevented high-poverty districts
from maintaining equitable funding levels, despite increasing tax rates at a faster rate than
otherwise similar wealthier districts; and (f) leveling up funding for high-poverty districts in
Texas would cost the state $9.1 billion, a 17% increase in education spending. The study
provides evidence on how school districts were impacted by recessionary spending cuts and how
they responded, and offers alternative strategies for restoring state education budgets.
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Are High-Poverty School Districts Disproportionately Impacted by State Funding Cuts?
School Finance Equity Following the Great Recession
States implemented unprecedented cuts to public education funding following the Great
Recession. Almost every state reduced its total K-12 funding from the 2007-08 school year to
2012-13 and very few have restored funding to pre-recessions levels (Leachman, Albares,
Masterson and Wallace 2016). While federal stimulus funding helped alleviate some of the
spending cuts during the 2009-10 school year, numerous districts around the country still
conducted substantial budget cuts and staff layoffs (Goldhaber, Strunk, Brown and Knight 2016;
Knight and Strunk 2015). When states reduce education funding, the burden of these cuts often
falls most heavily on the districts that serve greater proportions of students in poverty and
emergent bilingual students (Baker 2014). Meanwhile, these higher-need districts face additional
costs to provide compensatory educational programs (Darling-Hammond 2013; Duncombe and
Yinger 2008; Ladd 2012).
Prior research shows that school finance reforms – either court-mandated or those
initiated solely through legislative action – lead to increases in spending for low-income districts,
thereby closing gaps in resources and increasing state school finance equity (Murray, Evans and
Schwab 1998). More importantly, several studies link court-mandated increases in spending to
improved educational and labor market outcomes for low-income students (e.g., Card and Payne
2002; Jackson, Johnson and Perscio 2014). Few studies, however, examine the impact of
recessions and state budget cuts on school finance systems, especially school resource equity.
The purpose of this study is to assess the extent to which high-poverty districts across the
country experienced a disproportionate share of state funding cuts following the Great
Recession. Analyses then draw on data specific to Texas to explore underlying causes of
disparities in budget cuts and how high- and low-poverty districts differed in their responses to

funding declines. The study examines the following research questions: (a) To what extent are
school districts compensated for higher rates of student poverty, and how did resource gaps
change during the Great Recession? (b) To what extent did changes in the income-based funding
gap vary across states? And, (c) to what extent did high- and low-poverty districts in Texas
differ in their response to state funding cuts, if at all?
I find that prior to the recession, high-poverty districts received $289 per student less
state and local funding, on average, compared to otherwise similar low-poverty districts. By
2012-13, the funding gap between high- and otherwise similar low-poverty districts increased to
$1,004 per student. Conditions for high-poverty districts were significantly worse in Texas,
where the funding gap increased by more than in 43 other states. Growth in the funding gap
nationally resulted from greater declines in state funding for high-poverty districts, compared to
low-poverty districts. However, in Texas, the funding gap increased primarily as a result of
substantial increases in local funding for low-poverty districts. Low-poverty districts in Texas
increased their local revenues by relatively more than high-poverty districts by passing more
bonds and experiencing far greater increases in local per-pupil property values. Meanwhile, highpoverty districts in Texas were more likely to levy the maximum allowed local tax rate and on
average, increased local property taxes at a faster rate (and to a higher level) than low-poverty
districts in the years following the recession. In short, states failed to protect their highest needs
school districts in the years following the recession, both in Texas and nationally.
The following section synthesizes prior research that informs this study and shows how
the current analyses address an important gap in the literature. I then provide additional policy
context for Texas and nationally, describe the data, analytic approach, and findings and conclude
with discussion and state policy recommendations.
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Background Literature
Three board areas of research inform the current study. The first assesses equity and
efficiency of state school finance systems and district resource allocation. A second set of studies
focuses on lessons learned from budgetary cuts associated with the recent recession and the third
area measures the impact of state school finance reforms on student outcomes.
Assessment of State School Finance Systems
Ideally, states rely on the best available evidence to improve their school finance systems
in ways that promote adequacy and equity. Adequate finance systems provide sufficient school
resources to meet state standards, while school finance equity is defined as the allocation of
resources, broadly defined, that meets diverse student needs (Baker and Green 2015). Early
analyses of school finance equity used measures of dispersion of per-pupil funding across
districts (Berne and Stiefel 1994; Rolle and Liu 2007). Other analyses measured “fiscal
neutrality” by assessing the correlation between per-student spending in a district and local
property wealth (e.g., Cortez 2008; 2009; Goldhaber and Callahan 2001; Odden and Picus 2014).
These measures do not account for differences in costs outside the control of districts such as
higher labor costs or differences in need related to the student population (Baker, Farrie,
Johnson, Luhm, and Sciarra 2017; Chambers and Levin 2009).
More sophisticated analyses take into account differences in cost and attempt to measure
and control for inefficiency of districts (Duncombe and Yinger 2008; Imazeki and Reschovsky
2001). Although scholars debate the validity of cost and efficiency estimates (Hanushek 1997;
2007), there is consensus that comparisons of district spending should take into account
differences in cost factors outside the control of districts (Duncombe 2006) and that effective
state school finance systems compensate districts with higher cost factors and greater student
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need (Knight, 2012; Odden and Picus 2014; Verstegen 2011). Regardless of the specific methods
used, most studies of state school finance systems find inequitable funding across high- and lowpoverty districts. National studies of state school finance systems show that approximately one in
five states allocates substantially more (10%) state and local funding to their highest-poverty
school districts (e.g., Baker et al., 2017; Chingos, 2017; Ushomirsky and Williams, 2015). These
prior studies focus on state and local revenues or total expenditures and do not specifically
explore the impact of the Great Recession. The current study builds on previous research by
incorporating additional resource measures such as staffing ratios and salaries and by focusing
specifically on the impact of the recent recession.
Effects of the Great Recession on State School Finance Systems
Several recent studies analyze the impact of the Great Recession across and within school
districts (Goldhaber et al. 2016; Plecki, Elfers and Finster 2010). These studies find that state aid
cuts disproportionately impacted high-poverty districts, and state school finance systems
generally become more inequitable following the recession (Baker, 2014; Estrada 2012; Evans,
Schwab & Wagner, 2017; also see Freelon, Bertrand and Rogers, 2012 for qualitative analysis
and practitioner survey data on the effects of the recession). While informative, these national
studies do not focus on or offer policy implications specific to one state. The current study adds
to this prior work by incorporating more detailed data from Texas that is not available in national
datasets (local tax rates and property values). These data are used to explore the specific features
of the Texas state school finance system that led to the disproportionate impact of the Great
Recession on low-income districts.
Finally, two recent studies examine the effects of the Great Recession within school
districts (Goldhaber et al. 2016; Strunk and Knight, 2015). Because teacher layoffs are typically
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conducted in order of reverse seniority within subject area, and high-poverty schools tend to
employ the least experienced teachers, teacher layoffs associated with the Great Recession
disproportionately impacted the high-poverty and high-minority schools within districts (Knight
and Strunk 2015). Teacher layoffs resulted in a substantial increase in teacher churn across
schools, further disadvantaging historically underserved schools (Goldhaber et al. 2016). In
short, inequities within school districts likely magnify the disparate impacts of Great Recssion
budget cuts.1
State School Finance Reform
Evidence from studies of school finance reforms suggests that school funding cuts for
students in poverty lead to negative long-term outcomes. Most studies focus on how finance
systems respond to legislative reforms and how reforms impact students’ educational
achievement and labor market outcomes (e.g., Card and Payne 2002; Murray et al. 1998;
Springer, Lui and Guthrie 2009). Many of these studies are correlational and therefore may
confound changes in educational spending with other changes that influence student outcomes
(see Figlio, 2004 and Krueger 1999). A few studies use strong research designs to isolate the
impact of changes in funding. For example, Guryan (2001) uses regression-discontinuity based
on distinct eligibility-based increases in state aid created by a 1993 school finance reform that
equalized spending across districts in Massachusetts. Guryan finds that increased spending
improved grade 4 reading and math scores, primarily for lower achieving students. Another

Other research looks more broadly at the impact of recessions. Not surprisingly, these studies find that
lower-income and less-educated workers and people of color experience greater negative impacts of
recessions (Farber, 2011; Kochhar, Fry & Taylor, 2011; Verick, 2009; Hines, Hoynes, & Krueger, 2001). Over a
30-year period, Hoynes, Miller, and Schaller (2012) found that labor market outcomes during recessions were
consistently worse for disadvantaged groups, resulting in greater declines in wages and longer spells of
unemployment.
1
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study follows school finance reforms nationally over three decades, using differential timing of
reforms to identify exogenous changes in spending (Jackson et al. 2014). The authors find that a
20% increase in educational spending during all 12 years of public schooling reduced the
incidence of poverty later in life by 20% and increased adult wages by 25%, but only for students
from lower-income families. Although the data provide limited information around mechanisms,
these positive effects appeared to result from more teachers and counselors per student, leading
to smaller class sizes and more adults per student in schools. Other studies applying similar
comparative time series methods to examine the effects of exogenous shocks in spending
generated from court-mandated school finance reforms have reached similar conclusions
(Candelaria and Shores 2017; Lafortune, Rothstein and Schanzenbach 2016).
Based on the Jackson et al. (2014) results, a student in a high-poverty district who
experiences a decline in spending of around 10% would see a meaningful impact on their life
outcomes. If exposed to this decline in funding at the time of entering school, and this lower
funding level was in place for all 12 years of schooling, the results suggest that a student would
experience a 15% decline in their likelihood of graduating high school, an increase in their
likelihood of living in poverty of about 11%, and a decrease in their adult earnings of about 9%
or $3,500 per year.2 In short, the extent to which districts are compensated for higher poverty
rates – and the specific effects of the Great Recession –have real consequences for students.
Policy Context in Texas and Nationally
Texas provides a useful context for examining school finance issues. The state has a
significant influence on education policy nationally, a long history of court battles attempting to

2

This dollar figure is based on the descriptive statistics shown in Table 1 of Jackson et al. (2014). Note that the
Jackson et al. study is based on court-ordered increases in spending rather than decreases in spending. For estimates
of the negative short-term impacts of the school budget cuts associated with the Great Recession, see Shores and
Steinberg (2017).
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establish an equitable finance system, and substantial overall size (roughly 10% of all K-12
students in the U.S.) and student diversity, which is increasingly reflected in national trends
(Baker 2012; Picus 1994; and see Cuban 2010 and Preuss 2009 for the state’s influence on
education policy nationally). In 2011, the 82nd Texas Legislature cut K-12 public education by
$4 billion for the 2011-12 and 2012-13 school years (Barta 2011). The following year, over 600
school districts in Texas sued the state for violating the state constitutional mandate of providing
an adequate education for all students (Collier 2016). Ultimately, the Texas Supreme Court ruled
the finance system constitutional in May of 2016; however, the court’s opinion labeled the Texas
educational finance system antiquated and urged the Legislature to implement reforms (Texas
Taxpayer and Student Fairness Coalition, et al. v. Scott, Combs, and the State Board of
Education 2016). For the first time in recent memory, Texas state policymakers are moving
toward passing school finance reform without a court mandate (Swaby 2017). The recent Texas
Supreme Court opinion and potential state legislative actions make an analysis of Texas school
finance particularly timely.
Property Tax Revenues in Texas
Like many states, Texas school districts generate local tax revenues through annual
property taxes and school bonds (which must be spent on school facilities). The current Texas
school finance system is described in detail in other publications (e.g., Texas Taxpayers and
Research Association [TTARA] 2014; Davis, Dawn-Fisher, McKenzie, Rainey & Wall 2014). I
focus on the aspects pertinent to the current analysis and direct the interested reader to other
more detailed descriptions.
Local tax revenues are generated through Maintenance and Operation (“M&O”) taxes,
which pay for salaries and operating expenses, and Interest and Sinking (“I&S”) taxes, which are
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used to repay school bond. In 2013-14, Texas school districts raised $19.7 billion through M&O
tax revenues and $4.9 billion through I&S tax revenues (TTARA 2014). The state provides lowproperty wealth districts with additional funding by equalizing the tax base from which M&O tax
revenues are generated. In other words, the state ensures that low-wealth districts can generate
the same funding for each increase in their tax rate as the district at the 95th percentile of
property wealth. The state also sets a maximum amount of funding that high-property wealth
districts (“Chapter 41 districts”) can generate, and additional money is recaptured and used to
fund property poor districts (through tax-base equalization). Referred to as the “Robin Hood”
plan, this provision is unique to the Texas school finance system (Hoxby and Kuziemko 2004).
The revenues raised through I&S taxes are not subject to Chapter 41 recapture and the
funding base on which I&S taxes are levied are not necessarily equalized across high- and lowpoverty districts. The state equalizes tax bases for I&S taxes only up to $35 per student for each
penny (0.01%) of property tax. Districts must apply for tax base equalization and the state
provides only a limited amount funding, up until $250 per student has been allocated (funding
the lowest-property wealth districts first).3 As a result, districts debt service funding lacks state
equalization. I&S tax policies have not been updated since 2001 and substantial research on
school facilities funding in Texas highlights how lack of equalization contributes to an
inequitable system (Duncombe and Wan 2009; Rivera and Lopez 2017).
School Funding in Texas and Nationally
The Texas school system currently educates over 5 million students under a budget of
approximately $49 billion for the 2014-15 school year (Texas Legislative Budget Board 2016).

3

This foundation program is called the Instructional Facilities Allotment. The Legislature also authorized the
Existing Debt Allotment (EDA) foundation program in 1999 to assist low-wealth districts in repaying existing bonds
(TEA, 2016). The EDA provides $35 dollars per student per penny of tax rate up to $0.29.
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For both Texas and nationally, the 2009-10 school year was the first time in at least 15 years
(i.e., as far back as data are available) that nominal state and local funding decreased, on average,
from the prior year. Federal funding saw its largest increase that year, when stimulus funding
was distributed, but federal funding declined in subsequent years. In the years prior to 1998-99,
Texas districts received approximately equal to or greater than the national average state and
local funding per pupil. Since the 1999-00 school year, Texas has provided districts with less
state and local funding than the national average, even as the average poverty rate has been 5-6
percentage points above the national average. Given the higher poverty rates in Texas compared
to the rest of the country, the state has historically received more federal dollars per pupil than
the average U.S. district (before applying cost adjustment to Texas districts).
Table 1 shows differences in average student demographics and resources in high- and
low-poverty districts, in 2007-08 and 2012-13, for Texas districts and for all other districts in the
country. In both Texas and the rest of the country, poverty rates and eligibility for the FRL
program increased from before to after the recession. For example, from 2007-08 to 2012-13, the
average poverty rate for districts in Texas at or above the 75th percentile of poverty rose from
33% to 36%. Nationwide, the average poverty rate for the highest poverty districts rose from
25% to 30%. The bottom panel of Table 2 shows that in both Texas and nationally, resource
advantages for higher-poverty districts narrowed and resource gaps for higher-poverty districts
increased. For example, in 2007-08, districts in the bottom quartile of the poverty distribution
(wealthier districts) received total per-pupil revenues (PPR) of $11,343 per student, whereas
those in the top poverty quartile received $12,142, a difference of $799. By 2012-13, wealthier
districts received $213 more in total revenues. Similarly, from 2007-08 to 2012-13, Texas
districts in the bottom quartile of poverty saw a 0.2 FTE increase in the number of teachers per
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100 students, while districts in the bottom quartile experienced a 0.4 FTE decline in the number
of teachers per 100 students; similar trends existed nationally. These numbers provide cursory
evidence that higher poverty districts incurred a disproportionate impact of recessionary budget
cuts. These differences may also be due to changes in other cost-related factors such enrollment,
other student demographics, or the cost of living. In the following section, I describe my analytic
approach to exploring this issue further.
Data and Analytic Approach
Data
The analyses combine district-level data from the National Center of Education Statistics
and the U.S. Census Bureau Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates with the Education
Comparable Wage Index (Taylor and Fowler 2006) and data provided by the Texas Education
Agency, Public Education Information Management System (PEIMS). PEIMS includes
information on property wealth and assessed value per pupil, local tax rates, and the number of
students in Texas enrolled in special programs. Although these data span school years 1994-95 to
2012-13, my primary interest is in 2007-08 to 2012-13.4 Finally, for school years 2008-09 to
2012-13, I combine these data with district-level grade 3-8 achievement data provided by the
Stanford Education Data Archive (Reardon et al. 2016).
The analytic dataset includes a total of 248,331 district-year observations over 19 years
(19,318 in Texas) including 12,723 districts observations in 2012-13 nationally and 1,004 in
Texas. I exclude outlier district-observations that have more than $70,000 in total per-pupil
revenues in any particular year (a total of 23 in 2012-13 and 0.2% of all districts that would
otherwise have been in the sample). Eight of these cases were school districts in Texas and each

4

In the four years prior to 1998-99, the proportion of students classified as limited English proficient is not available
and I backwards impute these variables for districts with non-missing values in 1998-99.
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of those involved districts with extremely high assessed property values.5 The preferred model
excludes these outliers because they may distort the relationship between funding and poverty
rates. Sensitivity analyses show results change very little when these districts are included.
Analytic Approach
Assessing differences in resources across otherwise similar high- and low-poverty
districts. For the analyses that address research question 1, I adjust per-pupil revenues in order
to assess how much funding each district receives, relative to other districts with similar cost
factors. Prior research suggests districts with lower total enrollment have higher production costs
because of diseconomies of scale (Adams and Foster 2010; Gronberg, Jansen, Taylor and Booker
2005). Greater population sparsity increases the cost of transportation and other expenses that are
out of the control of school districts (Duncombe and Yinger 2010). Districts in labor markets
with higher average salaries also face higher costs because they must pay higher salaries to
attract the same quality of workforce, compared to otherwise similar districts in lower labor cost
areas (Taylor and Fowler 2005). Finally, districts with greater proportions of students enrolled in
special education, classified as English language learners (ELL), or from low-income families
face greater costs (Ladd 2012). Districts with very high concentrations of poverty face added
challenges associated with peer interactions (Hanushek, Kain, Markman and Rivkin 2003).
I use two approaches to examine how average funding in otherwise similar high- and
low-poverty districts changed during the recession. In the first approach, described in equation 1,
I estimate separate regressions for each year. The model includes state fixed effects, φds, the
district poverty rate and its square, and interactions between poverty variables and the state fixed

5

For example, Rankin ISD had an assessed property value of $11.3 million per WADA for school year 2012-13, far
above the average of $562,000 for that school year. As a result, the district’s local funding amounted to $87,532 per
pupil, representing 89% of its total funding.
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effects (labeled φds * f (POVERTYds) in equation 1). This modeling strategy allows the
relationship between poverty rates and outcomes to vary by state and year. I first estimate perpupil state and local revenue (PPRds) across all districts and states, in each school year from
1994-95 to 2012-13, indexing for districts (d) and states (s):
PPRds = β0 + φds + f (POVERTYds) + φds * f (POVERTYds) +  COST_FACTORSds + εds

(1)

The vector labeled COST_FACTORSds includes controls for geographic differences in the
cost of labor, the percent of students in the district with individualized education plans (IEPs),
the percent classified as ELL, district enrollment size (dummy variables for whether the districts
has between 2,000 and 500 students and less than 500), and population density as measured by a
set of 6 dummy variables indicating the degree of the district’s urbanicity in a particular year. I
do not adjust for inflation as the primary focus is on funding gaps across districts each year.
Student demographics are only weakly correlated with student poverty rates (less than 0.4 in
most cases) and therefore capture additional unique variation in local cost factors. Models run
without the poverty squared term yield similar results, but I include this term given research cited
earlier about how the relationship between costs and poverty rate changes at different levels of
poverty concentrations (Hanushek et al. 2003).
The error term, εds, captures differences in the per-pupil revenues within states across
districts with otherwise similar observable cost factors. These differences may arise if state
finance systems are compensating districts for unobserved cost factors such as career and
technical education programs or for higher proportions of low-incidence (high cost) special
education students (the data only permit controlling for the percent of students with IEPs, but not
specific special education categories). Differences may also arise simply from idiosyncrasies in
state school finance systems that allow two otherwise similar districts to receive different levels
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of funding in the same year, which is surprisingly common across states (this issue is referred to
as horizontal equity; see Rose and Weston 2013 and Rolle and Lui 2007 for examples).
I then compute the predicted value of per-pupil revenues for districts in Texas and
nationally at census poverty rates of 10%, 20%, and 30%.6 These values translate roughly to the
10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles, respectively. The preferred model includes all districts in the
U.S. because my goal is to compare districts in Texas to otherwise similar districts nationally.
The state-by-poverty rate fixed effects allow the relationship between poverty rate and funding
level to vary by state. Calculating the post-estimation predicted values provides adjusted funding
rates at particular points in the poverty distribution (rather than just a coefficient for the poverty
rate). In various extensions, I replace poverty rate with poverty rate percentile (within each state
and year), the percent FRL, property values per pupil, and also run models on Texas districts
only, adding Texas-specific covariates that align with student weights in the Texas school
finance system. I use the standard errors of predicted values to determine if differences in
funding between high- and low-poverty districts are statistically significant. Prior literature
suggests that differences in funding of 5% are educationally significant and an increase of 20%
can close two-thirds of the gaps in outcomes between children from high- and low-income
families (Jackson et al. 2014).
Examining variation across states. To further explore how the relationship between
funding and poverty rates changed over time, and to explicitly parse out variation in changes in
the funding gap across states over time, I pool school years and use three-way interactions
between year, state, and poverty rate. These models are run only for school years 2007-08 to

6

Adjusted per-pupil revenues are estimated using the margins command in STATA, which computes the predicted
value of the outcome measure at specified values (i.e., at particular poverty rates and for particular states), holding
all other variables constant at their observed levels (see Cameron & Trivedi, 2009 for more information on marginal
predictions. The approach described here is similar to the one used in Baker (2014).
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2012-13, using 2007-08 and Texas as the base year and state from which all other interactions
are compared. The null hypothesis in these models is that the funding gap did not change from
2007-08 to 2012-13 in Texas. I test the null hypothesis by examining whether the interaction
between the poverty variable and the 2012-13 year fixed effect is statistically different from zero
(because the Texas-by-2007-08 year fixed effect is the reference group for all other state-by-year
fixed effects). All other poverty rate and state-by-year fixed effects interactions show the level of
variation in the change in the funding gap across states (research question 2) and in particular,
how changes in the funding gap differed from that of Texas.
The model is similar to a difference-in-difference (DID) framework (Bertrand et al.,
2004), except that both high- and low-poverty groups were “treated” (by recessionary funding
cuts) and the alternate hypothesis being tested is that the treatment effects differed from one
group (high-poverty districts), compared to the other (low-poverty districts). For this reason, I
explicitly examine the assumptions necessary for causal interpretation under a DID framework.
For both approaches described above, I exchange the outcome measure, state and local per-pupil
revenues, with a number of alternate funding and resource variables, including total funding per
pupil, average staff salaries, and the number of teachers, counselors, support staff, and total staff
per 100 students.
Exploring the underlying mechanisms of changes in resource gaps. To address the
second research question, I use two approaches to examine potential underlying causes of
changes in funding disparities during and after the recession. First, I examine whether changes in
local tax revenues varied across high- and low-income districts in Texas and nationally. On the
one hand, prior research suggests lower-poverty, higher-wealth districts may have greater
capacity than high-poverty districts to increase local tax revenues in response to state funding
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declines (Hoxby 1998; Odden and Clune 2009; Picus 1991). On the other hand, because highpoverty districts typically receive a greater proportion of funding from state revenues (Kirst,
Goertz and Odden 2007), high-poverty districts may feel more pressure to increase their local tax
rates and local tax revenues following a decline in state funding.
Second, I draw on data specific to Texas to compare changes in local property values and
tax rates (the underlying determinants of local tax revenues) across the district poverty
distribution. High-poverty districts in Texas may rely especially on M&O tax revenues, since the
state equalizes these tax bases up to the level of the 95th percentile of district property wealth
(for the first 0.04% of additional taxes). In contrast, lower-poverty districts may rely on I&S tax
increases because these districts do not rely on property wealth equalization and because I&S tax
revenues are not subject to Chapter 41 recapture. In order to compare otherwise similar high- and
low-poverty districts, I examine changes in revenue by funding source and changes in local
property values using the model described in equation 1.
Findings
Changes in Resources and Outcomes across Districts
Results for research question 1 are shown in Table 2 and Figure 1. Each column in Table
2 is a separate regression predicting a different outcome (only relevant covariates are displayed).
The models in Table 1 pool years 2007-08 to 2012-13 and include interactions between the
poverty rate variables and state-by-year fixed effects, using Texas and 2007-08 as the base year
and state. Because Texas and the year 2007-08 are the base year and state for all other state-byyear poverty rate interactions, the main effect of the poverty rate represents the relationship
between poverty rate and funding level in 2007-08 in Texas. Thus the coefficient in the first row
of the first column shows that in 2007-08, Texas school districts received about $9 per pupil less
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for each one percentage point increase in the district’s poverty rate, other observable district cost
factors being equal. That this coefficient is statistically insignificant for Texas suggests that in
2007-08 there was not a systematic relationship between funding levels and the poverty rate. The
interaction with poverty rate and the state-by-year fixed effect (for 2012-13), shown in the
second row demonstrates how funding across the poverty distribution changed in 2012-13,
compared to 2007-08. Otherwise similar districts in Texas received $57 per pupil less in state
and local funding for each one percentage point increase in the poverty rate, compared to the
2007-08 school year.
Figure 1 helps put these estimates in perspective by plotting state and local funding per
student over time, for districts that have 10% poverty rate (roughly the 10th percentile) and
districts with 30% poverty (the 90th percentile), in Texas (left) and all other states (right). Prior
to the recession, low- and high-poverty districts in Texas received $11,349 and $11,039,
respectively, creating an income-based funding gap of $311. By the 2012-13 school year, the
average district with 10% poverty received $12,297 per student, whereas an otherwise similar
district with 30% of students in poverty received $10,945 ($1,352 or 11% fewer dollars per
pupil). These differences are both statistically and educationally significant. As the figure makes
clear, the funding gap began to emerge in 2008-09, at the onset of the Great Recession budget
cuts. Even when federal funding is included, high-poverty districts in Texas receive 5.5% less
funding than otherwise similar low-poverty districts. This funding gap will likely have tangible
consequences if left unaddressed for the lifespan of a student’s K-12 experience (Jackson et al.,
2014). The trends in Texas are similar to all other states (right side of Figure 1), except that the
gap in state and local funding did not expand by as much. Nationally, the income-based funding
gap went from $117 to $834 per student, an increase of $662, whereas the funding gap in Texas
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increased from $310 to $1,352, representing an increase of $1,041.
Interactions between the poverty rate and other state-by-year fixed effects for school year
2012-13 (not shown in Table 2) show how the relationship between poverty rates and funding
levels (i.e., the funding progressiveness) changed in other states, relative to Texas. This
interaction term is positive for 43 states, implying that the Texas school finance system
experienced a greater decline in progressiveness than did 43 other states following the Great
Recession (from 2007-08 to 2012-13), and the difference is statistically significant for eight of
those states. Conversely, only six states experienced a greater decline in progressiveness than did
Texas and only one state, New Mexico, declined by a statistically significant amount more than
Texas (Hawaii is not included; full results are available from the author upon request). Although
the funding gap increased in Texas by more than in most other states, across the country, highpoverty districts, on average, experienced a disproportionate share of the funding cuts associated
with the Great Recession.
Results for total per-pupil funding in Texas (local, state, and federal revenues), shown in
column 2 of Table 2, are similar to the results for state and local funding, except that prior to the
recession, otherwise similar districts in Texas received about $13 more in funding for each
additional percentage point of students in poverty (row 1 of column 2). As shown in columns 3-8
of Table 2, these declines in funding for high-poverty districts, relative to low-poverty districts,
were accompanied by relative decreases in spending, average salaries, and staff per student.
Whether the Great Recession spending cuts caused the funding gap depends on two
underlying assumptions common to a difference-in-difference framework (Bertrand et al. 2004).
The first is that the treatment and comparison groups followed similar trends prior to treatment.
As Figure 1 shows, during the three years leading up to the recession, from 2005-06 to 2007-08,
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high- and low-poverty districts followed similar trends in state and local funding (and in other
outcomes not shown, available upon request). The second assumption is that the treatment was
“unanticipated” or exogenous and no other factors that differentially impacted treatment or
“control” groups (high- and low-poverty districts) at the same time as the treatment took place
(Angrist and Pischke 2009). Policy scans show that no policy changes were made to the finance
system during this period other than the recession-induced budget cuts. Descriptive statistics
show that the proportion of special education students and students classified as ELL did not
change significantly in either high- or low-poverty districts.7 In short, evidence that these two
assumptions are tenable suggests that the trends in the outcomes measures would have continued
to be parallel if not for the Great Recession and therefore changes in trends can be attributed to
the recessionary funding cuts.
Similar models estimated for achievement show the state also experienced an increase
from 2008-09 to 2012-13 in the income-based achievement gap on standardized statewide
assessments.8 In 2008-09, each 1% increase in poverty rate was associated with a decline of
between 0.049 and 0.054 standard deviations (SD) in English Language Arts and between 0.044
and 0.062 SD in Math. These coefficients equate to roughly a 1 SD achievement gap between
districts with 10% and 30% poverty rate. By 2012-13, the gap for English Language Arts had
increased by between 0.005 and 0.018 SD for each 1% increase in poverty rate. The changes in
the achievement gap from 2008-09 to 2012-13 in Math are less consistent. The gap for grade 4
increased by 0.006, though that difference is not statistically significant. In grades 7 and 8, the
gap decreased by 0.008 and 0.009 SD (although those differences are only significant at p<0.1).

7

Other changes that may have taken place, such as increases in average poverty rates or decreases in property values
are considered part of the treatment effects.
8
Based on the Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills and the State of Texas Assessments of Academic
Readiness, taken from Reardon et al., 2016). Nationally normed data for 2007-08 are not available.
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Changes in achievement gaps over time likely increased for a multitude of reasons, many
of which could be related to changes in socioeconomic conditions associated with the Great
Recession. For example, lower-income families experienced greater increases in unemployment
compared to higher-income families (Hoynes et al. 2012). Similarly, states may have reduced the
availability of social services available in high-poverty neighborhoods, whereas families in
lower-poverty neighborhoods rely less on these services. The data do not permit establishing a
causal inference associated with the recession or with funding cuts. However, these results
confirm that income-based achievement gaps increased in Texas during and immediately
following the Great Recession. This finding is important given that high-poverty districts also
saw relative decreases in the level of resources available in their neighborhood schools.
Exploring Mechanisms for Funding Changes
The second research question explores changes in revenues by funding source and
changes in local property values and taxes. These results are shown in Figure 2 and in Table 3.
Figure 2 shows that the funding gap increased in Texas primarily because of differences in
increases in local funding between high- and low-poverty districts. Texas actually protected state
funding for high-poverty districts, reducing per-pupil state funding by only $670, compared to
$1,052 in wealthier, low-poverty districts. However, the state did not take strong enough
measures to prevent expansion of the funding gap given the large increases in local tax revenues
for low-poverty Texas districts. Low-poverty districts experienced a $2,000 increase in local perpupil funding, while high-poverty districts experienced a $576 increase. In all other states, local
tax revenues also increased by more in low-poverty districts, but the differences were much
smaller. Conversely, on average nationally, high-poverty districts experienced greater declines in
state funding compared to otherwise similar low-poverty districts.
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In summary, the income-based funding gap, as measured by state and local tax revenues
allocated to high- and otherwise similar low-poverty districts increased nationally following the
Great Recession. On average nationally, the gap expanded as a result of state funding cuts
concentrated in high-poverty districts. Conversely, in Texas, the state took some measures to
protect high-poverty districts from funding cuts, but large increases in local tax revenues caused
the funding gap to increase by more in Texas than in most other states.
Table 3 provides explanation for why this may have occurred. First, Panel A shows that
in 2008, 12.0% of low-poverty districts were assessing the statutory maximum M&O tax rate of
$1.17, whereas 16.8% of otherwise similar high-poverty districts had reached the maximum
M&O rate, a difference of 4.8 percentage points (differences are shown in Panel E). By 2013,
22% of low-poverty districts and 32% of high-poverty districts were assessing the maximum
local tax rates.9 Similarly, Panel B shows that high-poverty districts increased average local tax
rates at a faster rate than low-poverty districts. High-poverty districts increased average M&O
tax rates by $0.024 (from $1.056 in 2008 to $1.080 in 2013), while low-poverty, wealthier
districts increased local tax rates by $0.015 (the difference in these increases of 0.009 is not
statistically significant).
Recall that the state does not equalize tax bases for I&S taxes (used to repay bonds) to the
same extent as M&O taxes. Perhaps not surprisingly then, low-poverty districts increased I&S
tax rates at a faster rate (and to a higher level) than high-poverty districts. As shown in the final
column of Panel C, on average, low-poverty districts increased I&S taxes by $0.054, whereas
high-poverty districts increased I&S taxes by $0.015. Finally, low-poverty districts experienced

9

The outcomes shown in Table 3 are based on regressions that include the covariates listed in equation 1. As with
other outcomes, I also ran models that pool years and interact year fixed effects with poverty rate variables, similar
to a traditional difference-in-difference framework. These results are consistent with those presented here and
available from the author upon request.

20

slower rates of growth in per-pupil property value over this same time period (Panel D).10
Altogether, the results shown in Table 3 suggest that while high-poverty districts
increased their local tax rates more than wealthier districts, the amount of funding generated
from these taxes was limited by their relatively slower property value growth. At the same time,
low-poverty, wealthier districts successfully compensated for decreases in state funding by
increasing their I&S tax rates (which are not subject to recapture and are not equalized to the
same extent as M&O taxes) and by experiencing significant growth in local property values.
Extensions and Sensitivity Analyses
The findings described above are consistent across a number of specification checks. I
test the preferred model shown in column 1 of Table 2 for just 2012-13 school year. When I omit
controls for the percent of students in SPED and classified as ELL, the coefficient for poverty
rate for Texas declines, but does not change significantly. The coefficient on district poverty
increases when I include 23 outlier districts (8 of which are in Texas). Results are also consistent
when I replace the census poverty rate variable with the percent of students eligible for FRL or
the percentile of poverty rate, rather than the percent.
I also run five separate models on Texas districts only. I first run a model identical to the
preferred model (for just 2012-13), this time only for Texas. I then replace control variables with
Texas-specific covariates provided by TEA that correspond to specific student weights in the
Texas funding formula.11 In both models, the coefficient for district poverty is roughly double

10

Although not shown, enrollment rates were relatively constant over the time period, on average, for both high- and
low-poverty districts.
11
The variables include the percent of students in career and technical education, in high, middle, and low cost
special education categories, in English as a Second Language programs, in Bilingual programs, and the percent
deemed “at risk.” Correlations among these variables are all below 0.40. Based on cost studies of SPED categories
(e.g., Duncombe & Yinger, 2008) and the student weights in the Texas school finance system, low-cost SPED
categories include: learning disability, intellectual disability, and emotional disturbance; middle-cost SPED
categories include: orthopedic impairment, other health impairment, auditory impairment, visual impairment, speech
impairment, and non-categorical early childhood; and high-cost categories are: deaf-blindness, autism, and traumatic
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the size from the preferred model and the coefficient for the cost of labor index switches
direction. That is, other factors held constant, Texas actually allocates less funding to higher cost
districts, which further disadvantages high-poverty districts (given the substantial increase in the
poverty coefficient for these Texas-only models). In the final three models, I exchange the
measure of district need – the student poverty rate – with district property values per student,
district property values per weighted student, and district property values per weighted student
per percentage of M&O property tax. When the model is run on Texas districts only, the funding
gap is larger than in the preferred model $2,829 (21%). Funding gaps based on district property
values per student, district property values per weighted student, and district property values per
weighted student per percentage of M&O property tax are $5,210, $5,482, and $5,284 (roughly a
60% gap). In short, regardless of the model specification or the measure of student need, by the
end of the Great Recession, there was a substantial funding gap for high-need districts, after
taking into account local cost factors.
Discussion
This study finds that the Great Recession inequitably impacted higher-need districts
nationally, and that these disparate impacts were greater in Texas than in most other states across
the country. Like most states, the Texas legislature faced a substantial budget deficit and elected
to cut funding for public education, using federal dollars to fill gaps in 2009-10 and reducing
funding by over $4 billion the following two years. Although legislatures reached a compromise
between cutting funding evenly for all districts and protecting high-poverty districts, lack of
subsidies for facilities funding and various hold harmless agreements embedded in the Texas

brain injury. The correlations between the federally reported percent of students with IEPs in Texas in 2012-13
(from the Common Core of Data) and the percent of students with low-, middle- and high-cost special education
categories (from TEA) are 0.187, 0.523, and 0.790, respectively.
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school finance system caused the highest-need districts to be inequitably impacted.
The study uncovers some of the specific mechanisms that contributed to the growing
funding gaps in Texas over time. While high-poverty districts increased their tax rates at a faster
rate than low-poverty districts, their relative decline in property values, coupled with the
decreasing tax base equalization provided by the state, limited the benefits of these tax rate
increases. At the same time, low-poverty districts were able to raise local revenues at a faster rate
than high-poverty districts by issuing bonds (through I&S tax increases), which are not subject to
recapture and redistribution, and for which the state does not equalize tax bases for high-poverty
districts. One possible contributing factor to these trends is greater use of the “penny-swap” for
high-poverty districts, in which I&S taxes are moved to M&O taxes. Penny swaps increase total
tax revenue (since M&O tax revenues are more heavily subsidized by the state than I&S taxes)
without increasing households’ property tax payment. Finally, federal stimulus funding was not
distributed progressively enough to prevent disadvantaged students from bearing a
disproportionate impact of state funding cuts.
One of the key takeaways from this study is that high-poverty districts in Texas levy
higher local taxes than otherwise similar low-poverty districts, but receive less state and local
funding, and these gaps expanded following the Great Recession. Thus, a challenge facing Texas
policymakers is to reform the school finance system such that high-poverty districts receive at
least as much funding as otherwise similar low-poverty districts, particularly when high-poverty
districts are levying the highest possible tax rate. To estimate the cost of this policy and show
which regions in Texas would benefit, I simulate a budget policy that equalizes state and local
funding across the poverty distribution. I do this by estimating the predicted state and local
revenues at each point in the poverty distribution from 0% to 40%, in 2.5% increments for the
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2012-13 school year. The estimated per-pupil funding for districts with poverty rate of 2.5% is
$13,247, whereas otherwise similar districts with 30% of students in poverty receive $10,945 and
districts with a 40% poverty rate receive $10,914. Thus, for districts with between 30% and
32.5% poverty rates, I add $2,302 to calculate the simulated per-pupil funding and $2,333 for
districts with poverty rate between 40% and 42.5%. After imputing the simulated per-pupil
funding variable for each range of poverty rates, I re-estimate the relationship between poverty
rates and funding level. The results show that that otherwise similar districts receive the same
level of funding (about $13,247), regardless of poverty rate.
The results of this policy simulation are shown in Table 4. Each of the 20 educational
service regions in Texas would experience increases in their average per-pupil funding across
districts, but some would benefit more than others. On average, districts in Fort Worth would
receive an additional $1,523 per student, whereas the 12 districts in El Paso would receive
$2,258 in additional funding per pupil on average, the most of any other region. As shown in
Table 4, this policy would cost the state $9.1 billion, representing a 16.7% increasing in state and
local funding. This simulation highlights which districts and regions are underfunded in Texas
given their local cost factors and sheds light on the difficult choices facing the Texas legislature.
Conclusion
Although the Texas Supreme Court’s recent decision declared the finance system
constitutional, the court’s opinion made clear that substantial reforms are needed to fix the
outdated and “byzantine” system. This study shows that in addition to distributing state and local
funding inequitably, the funding system is not recession-proof. The combination of the
foundation formula, guaranteed tax base, and Chapter 41 recapture did not successfully protect
high-poverty districts from experiencing a disproportionate impact of the recessionary budget
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cuts, despite their relatively greater effort to increase local tax rates. As the state considers
reforming its school finance system, it may benefit from considering how the highest-need
districts will be protected from the next major state budget cut.
The failure of the Texas school finance system to protect high-need districts is not
specific to the state. The analyses described here found that across the country, state funding cuts
disproportionately harmed high-poverty districts. Many states are currently conducting their own
assessments of the impact of the recession on their school finance system and considering
strategies for reform (Bunting, Kueneman, Louttit, Park and Parker 2014). Texas could therefore
serve as a leader in designing a new school finance system designed to both provide an equitable
level of funding and withstand the negative impacts of future economic recessions.
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FIGURE 1
Adjusted state and local revenue per pupil in Texas and all other states, for low-poverty school
districts (10% poverty rate) and high poverty school districts (30% poverty rate), 1994-95 to
2012-13

Note. Revenue per pupil is based on predicted values from a regression that controls for a geographical cost of wage
index (Taylor, 2005), districts size, population density, and the proportion of students enrolled in special education
and with limited English proficiency. The model also includes state fixed effects so that district funding rates are
compared relative to other districts in the same state.

FIGURE 2
Changes in local, state, and federal per-pupil funding from 2007-08 to 2012-13, adjusting for
local district cost factors, Texas and all other states

Note. Funding rates are regression-based predicted values described in the text. This figure shows that local perpupil funding in Texas increased by $576 for high-poverty districts and by $2,000 for low-poverty districts. In total,
high-poverty districts in Texas experienced a $4 per-pupil increase in total funding from 2007-08 to 2012-13,
whereas low-poverty districts received a $948 increase (a $944 difference). In all other states, high-poverty districts
received a $176 increase and low-poverty districts received a $1,117 increase. The funding gap for just state and
local revenues increased by $1,041 in Texas and $662 in all other states (as shown in Figure 1).
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TABLE 1
Average characteristics for school districts with equal to or below the 25th percentile of poverty
rate and equal to or above the 75th percentile (within state and year), Texas and the United
States, 2007-08 and 2012-13
All other US school districtsa

Texas school districts
2007-08
≤ 25th

≥ 75th

2012-13
≤ 25th

≥ 75th

2007-08
≤ 25th

2012-13

≥ 75th

≤ 25th

≥ 75th

Average district characteristics and student demographics / outcomes
% Poverty

9.4%

32.9%

12.5%

35.9%

7.2%

24.9%

10.8%

29.8%

% FRL

32.7%

56.7%

39.3%

74.3%

22.3%

56.6%

30.9%

62.5%

% ELL

2.9%

7.4%

4.9%

12.6%

2.6%

6.4%

2.8%

6.3%

% SPED

10.7%

11.5%

8.8%

9.5%

13.0%

15.1%

12.8%

15.0%

% URM

24.9%

63.9%

32.5%

66.8%

12.8%

32.3%

18.8%

36.3%

Grade 3 ELA

0.314

-0.761

0.112

-1.022

0.590

-0.418

0.549

-0.542

Grade 3 Math

0.330

-0.583

0.316

-0.594

0.529

-0.388

0.470

-0.503

Fresh. grad. rate

85.1%

74.4%

n/a

n/a

87.2%

76.6%

n/a

n/a

Dist. Enroll.

5,654

4,536

6,624

6,054

4,651

3,252

4,864

3,603

Cost of Wage

1.32

1.12

1.45

1.30

1.34

1.21

1.43

1.33

Num. of districts

248

265

247

262

3004

3074

3164

2924

School inputs (unadjusted outcome measures)
Total PPR

11,343

12,142

12,420

12,206

12,653

13,293

13,617

14,027

St./local PPR

10,702

10,677

11,719

10,636

12,156

11,833

12,940

12,458

Per-pup. Exp.

8,792

10,195

9,230

10,041

10,463

11,336

11,448

12,003

Avg. salaries

39,095

36,804

42,362

39,963

50,466

46,069

52,398

49,576

Staff per 100 students
All Staff

12.8

14.6

13.0

14.2

14.9

17.7

14.3

16.3

Teachers

6.8

7.6

7.0

7.5

8.0

8.8

7.8

8.1

Guid. Coun.

0.3

0.3

0.3

0.3

0.3

0.4

0.3

0.3

Sup. Staff
0.5
0.6
0.6
0.7
0.4
0.5
0.4
0.6
all districts in the United States except for Texas. In order to match the analytic sample, I also omit Hawaii, the
District of Columbia, charter districts, and outlier districts that receive extremely high per-pupil revenues. The
figures are generally similar when I include these districts (available upon request).
Note. FRL stands for free and reduced price meals; ELL stands for English language learner, SPED stands for
special education, and URM stands for underrepresented minority. Grade 3 ELA and Math refer to the district
average grade 3 standardized exam scores, adjusted by NAEP to allow for national comparisons (Reardon et al.,
2016)
a
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TABLE 2
Regression coefficients predicting various school inputs by poverty rate for Texas school
districts, adjusted for other cost factors, 2007-08 to 2012-13
Adj. state/
local PPR

Adj. total
PPR

Adj. total
PPE

Avg.
Salaries

Staff per 100 pupils
Gd.
All Staff Teachers
Coun.

Poverty rate

-8.756
(17.212)

12.964
(17.837)

44.207***
(12.631)

62.482
(38.989)

0.091***
(0.013)

0.019**
(0.007)

-0.001
(0.001)

0.004+
(0.002)

Poverty rate
x 2012-13

-57.179*
(23.280)

-47.808*
(24.124)

-25.885
(17.083)

-68.964
(52.759)

-0.044*
(0.017)

-0.023*
(0.010)

0.000
(0.001)

0.000
(0.003)

0.563

0.545

0.623

0.77

0.651

0.576

0.437

0.394

R-squared

Sup.
Staff

Note. Each column is a separate regression. The base year is 2007-08, so coefficients for the interaction between
poverty rate and school year 2012-13 show how the relationship between poverty rate and resource levels changed
in 2012-13 relative to 2007-08. Covariates not shown include year dummies for 2008-09 through 2011-12 (and their
interaction with poverty rate in those years), poverty rate squared and year interactions (all of which are generally
not significant or significant but several orders of magnitude smaller than the main effect of poverty), district size,
population sparsity, the percent of students classified as English language learners and in special education, and an
educational geographic cost of wage index. PPR stands for per-pupil revenue and PPE stands for per-pupil
expenditures. + p< .10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.
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TABLE 3
Determinants of local tax revenues for high- and low-poverty districts in Texas, 2007-08 to
2012-13
Diff. 2008
to 2013
Panel A: Districts with the highest possible local maintenance and operations (M & O) property tax rate
12.0%
14.2%
13.6%
20.7%
18.7%
21.6%
0.096**
Low
poverty
(0.018)
(0.022)
(0.023)
(0.030)
(0.027)
(0.029)
(0.034)
16.8%
20.8%
25.7%
26.5%
28.1%
32.3%
0.155***
High
poverty
(0.021)
(0.021)
(0.021)
(0.020)
(0.022)
(0.021)
(0.030)
Panel B: Local M & O tax rate
1.050
1.054
1.053
1.065
1.062
1.065
0.015*
Low
poverty
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.006)
1.056
1.064
1.070
1.072
1.076
1.080
0.024***
High
poverty
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.004)
Panel C: Local interest and sinking (I & S) tax rate
0.174
0.184
0.199
0.215
0.207
0.228
0.054***
Low
poverty
(0.006)
(0.007)
(0.008)
(0.009)
(0.009)
(0.009)
(0.011)
0.148
0.153
0.159
0.160
0.165
0.162
0.015+
High
poverty
(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.006)
(0.005)
(0.008)
Panel D: Local property value per pupil
413,888
489,346
533,268
671,796
659,922
684,936
271,047***
Low
poverty
(17822)
(25859)
(25503)
(39964)
(37955)
(37952)
(41928)
246,815
302,749
311,129
409,542
409,205
390,788
143,973***
High
poverty
(16418)
(23683)
(20340)
(24974)
(22643)
(24095)
(29156)
Panel E: Differences between low-poverty and high-poverty districts
0.048+
0.065*
0.121***
0.058
0.094**
0.106**
0.058
Highest
M&O rate
(0.027)
(0.030)
(0.031)
(0.036)
(0.034)
(0.036)
(0.046)
0.006
0.010+
0.017**
0.008
0.014*
0.015*
0.009
Avg. M&O
rate
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.008)
-0.027**
-0.031***
-0.040*** -0.055*** -0.043*** -0.066***
-0.039**
Avg. I&S
rate
(0.008)
(0.009)
(0.010)
(0.011)
(0.010)
(0.011)
(0.013)
-167,073***
-186,597***
-222,140***
-262,254***
-250,717***
-294,147***
-127,074*
Prop. value
per pupil
(24232)
(35065)
(32621)
(47125)
(44196)
(44954)
(51069)
Note. Maintenance and operations taxes (“M & O”) generate local tax revenues that pay for the basic operations of
school districts (e.g., salaries, curricular materials, etc.). M&O tax revenues for high-poverty districts are largely
subsidized through state aid. Districts repay bonds by raising tax rates through Interest and sinking (“I & S”) taxes.
These taxes are not subject to recapture for equalization purposes and the state does not necessarily provide an equal
tax base for high-poverty districts (see text for more detail). + p< .10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.
2007-08

2008-09

2009-10

2010-11

2011-12

2012-13
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TABLE 4
Results of a policy simulation that equalizes state and local funding across poverty rates
State and Local Funding
Region
Edinburg
Corpus Christi
Victoria
Houston
Beaumont
Huntsville
Kilgore
Mt. Pleasant
Wichita Falls
Richardson
Fort Worth
Waco
Austin
Abilene
San Angelo
Amarillo
Lubbock
Midland
El Paso
San Antonio

Num. of
districts
36
39
38
50
32
56
96
47
37
80
76
77
55
42
42
59
52
27
12
51

Current
(unadj)

Current
(adjusted)

Sim.

Diff. (adj.
- sim.)

$10,012
$11,489
$13,800
$9,498
$10,253
$10,714
$9,652
$9,357
$11,889
$9,542
$10,924
$10,379
$10,497
$12,661
$12,878
$12,871
$14,074
$19,497
$9,892
$9,961

$10,155
$10,399
$10,975
$11,073
$11,201
$11,152
$10,638
$11,130
$12,045
$11,267
$11,294
$11,343
$11,252
$11,522
$11,778
$12,254
$11,328
$11,346
$10,800
$10,507

$12,392
$12,458
$12,887
$12,805
$13,069
$13,187
$12,683
$13,237
$13,915
$12,822
$12,818
$13,303
$12,795
$13,524
$13,784
$13,928
$13,393
$12,995
$13,117
$12,476

$2,133
$2,052
$1,911
$1,729
$1,869
$2,031
$2,042
$2,101
$1,874
$1,554
$1,523
$1,962
$1,543
$2,005
$1,998
$1,676
$2,055
$1,628
$2,258
$1,958

Avg.
enroll.

Total
enroll.

Total state &
local funding

Total funding
added

Funding
increase
(%)

11,011
2,666
1,407
21,416
2,531
3,135
1,751
1,209
1,036
9,237
7,194
2,011
6,716
1,076
1,123
1,456
1,559
2,993
14,871
8,058

396,407
103,956
53,459
1,070,803
80,977
175,570
168,048
56,824
38,330
738,982
546,734
154,811
369,404
45,201
47,185
85,906
81,087
80,824
178,447
410,975

$4,025,504,130
$1,081,076,715
$586,728,674
$11,857,282,169
$907,036,108
$1,958,033,558
$1,787,708,572
$632,467,554
$461,675,477
$8,325,970,526
$6,174,782,067
$1,755,953,394
$4,156,715,577
$520,808,505
$555,747,723
$1,052,698,568
$918,535,868
$917,027,089
$1,927,168,134
$4,318,035,400

$845,382,042
$213,325,564
$102,151,997
$1,851,436,484
$151,374,180
$356,614,364
$343,124,003
$119,385,425
$71,849,394
$1,148,563,660
$832,788,179
$303,778,555
$570,105,703
$90,627,898
$94,254,894
$143,992,906
$166,600,646
$131,578,935
$402,953,553
$804,616,058

21.0%
19.7%
17.4%
15.6%
16.7%
18.2%
19.2%
18.9%
15.6%
13.8%
13.5%
17.3%
13.7%
17.4%
17.0%
13.7%
18.1%
14.3%
20.9%
18.6%

Total
1,004
$11,185 $11,185 $13,059
$1,867
4,864 4,883,930 $54,624,427,286 $9,117,825,012
16.7%
Note. Sim. refers to the state and local funding under a policy simulation in which all districts in Texas would receive funding rates equal to the lowest-poverty
districts, after adjusting for local cost differences.

